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Background: Between 2007 and 2013, the Tanzanian public sector received 93.1 million doses of first-line anti-malarial
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) in the form of artemether-lumefantrine entirely supplied by funding
partners. The introduction of a health facility ACT stock monitoring system using SMS technology by the National
Malaria Control Programme in mid 2011 revealed a high frequency of stock-outs of ACT in primary care public health
facilities. The objective of this study was to determine the pattern of availability of ACT and possible causes of observed
stock-outs across public health facilities in Tanzania since mid-2011.
Methods: Data were collected weekly by the mobile phone reporting tool SMS for Life on ACT availability from over
5,000 public health facilities in Tanzania starting from September 2011 to December 2012. Stock data for all four age-dose
levels of ACT across health facilities were summarized and supply of ACT at the national level was also documented.
Results: Over the period of 15 months, on average 29% of health facilities in Tanzania were completely stocked out of all
four-age dose levels of the first-line anti-malarial with a median duration of total stock-out of six weeks. Patterns of total
stock-out by region ranged from a low of 9% to a high of 52%. The ACT stock-outs were most likely caused by:
a) insufficient ACT supplies entering Tanzania (e.g. in 2012 Tanzania received 10.9 million ACT doses compared with a
forecast demand of 14.4 million doses); and b) irregular pattern of ACT supply (several months with no ACT stock).
Conclusion: The reduced ACT availability and irregular pattern of supply were due to cumbersome bureaucratic
processes and delays both within the country and from the main donor, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria. Tanzania should invest in strengthening both the supply system and the health information system using
mHealth solutions such as SMS for Life. This will continue to assist in tracking ACT availability across the country where
all partners work towards more streamlined, demand driven and accountable procurement and supply chain systems.
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Malaria is of leading public health concern in Tanzania,
especially for children under the age of five and pregnant
women. According to the latest Tanzania HIV/AIDS and
Malaria Indicator Survey in 2011–12, the prevalence of
malaria rapid diagnostic test (mRDT) -confirmed malaria
in children under five was 9% [1]. This is an important re-
duction compared to findings from the previous five years
in the 2007–08 Malaria Indicator Survey, when 18% of* Correspondence: i.mikkelsen-lopez@unibas.ch
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article, unless otherwise stated.children under five tested positive for malaria [2]. Expend-
iture on malaria interventions (including prevention and
curative) accounts for 19.4% of total health expenditure
and 1.6% of Gross Domestic Product in Tanzania [3],
although the domestic budget for malaria activities has de-
creased by around 30% since 2005 [4]. The disease places
a large burden on the country’s health sector, accounting
for around 40% of outpatient department diagnoses in
2008 [5].
At the end of 2006, Tanzania changed its policy on first-
line anti-malarial treatment for uncomplicated malaria to
the use of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) -
artemether-lumefantrine (ALu) [2]; due to the high cost ofd Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hence-
forth referred to as the Global Fund) during its Round 4
disbursements in 2005 (continuing currently through
Round 9) to purchase ACT for use in the public sector. In
rural Tanzania, for fever it has been shown that 58% of the
population access their health services from public health
facilities and the remaining 42% access treatment from the
private sector, including faith-based organizations [6].
Tanzania’s Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW),
through its National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP), is
responsible for forecasting ACT demand and managing
Global Fund grants and the President’s Malaria Initiative
(PMI) ACT supplies for the malaria programme [7]. The
Pharmaceutical Services Section (PSS) is tasked with devel-
oping policy on pharmaceutical services and technologies.
The Medical Stores Department (MSD), a parastatal of the
MoHSW, is charged with handling health commodities for
the public sector, including ACT procurement, storage and
distribution [8]. Public health facilities order ACT quarterly
along with other medicines through a “pull” system via the
Integrated Logistic System (ILS) [9]. ACT are provided to
the public from government health facilities and, according
to policy, are dispensed free to children under the age of
five years and to adults over 60 years [10]. Others pay a
user fee in the public sector of TZS 1000 (USD 0.70) (fee
since 2007) [11]. As stated in the 2005 Integrated Manage-
ment of Childhood Illnesses Guidelines, ACT are given as a
presumptive treatment in the absence of diagnostic tests
when a child reports with fever without other symptoms,
such as rapid breathing or other respiratory symptoms,
which could indicate pneumonia or a common cold [12].
However recognizing that presumptive treatment may
result in over prescribing of ACT, mRDTs were rolled
out in Tanzania in early 2009, with national coverage by
early 2012, for routine use in all levels of care for parasito-
logical confirmation of malaria [13]. Apart from ACT, other
anti-malarials offered include sulphadoxine–pyrimethamine
(SP), which is recommended only as intermittent prevent-
ive treatment during pregnancy, and quinine, which is a
second-line treatment for cases contra-indicated for ACT,
administered to pregnant women in their first trimester, or
in cases of severe malaria not responding to first-line
treatment [14].
The design of the ACT procurement and delivery system
is intended to guarantee routine availability in the public
sector. Nonetheless, Tanzania, along with its neighbours,
has been experiencing public sector ACT stock-outs over
the past five years [7,15-21] with serious consequences for
health care delivery and also for household health expend-
iture, as seen in the Ulanga District in Tanzania [6]. The
objective of this study is to describe ACT availability across
public health facilities in Tanzania and highlight some of
the factors that influence it.Methods
Data on the availability of ACT were obtained from the
SMS for Life reporting system [22], which was originally
developed under a partnership consisting of the NMCP,
Roll Back Malaria, Novartis Pharma AG, Vodafone, IBM,
Medicines for Malaria Venture, and the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation, and which is now fully
owned and operated by the MoHSW with support from
the Global Fund. The SMS for Life system monitors weekly
ACT stock levels via a mobile phone Short Message
Service (SMS) for all four age-specific dose levels of ACT
plus quinine. The ACT doses are divided into individual
colour-coded blister packets according to weight of the
patient: yellow packs for infants weighing 5 kg to under
15 kg; blue packs for toddlers weighing 15 kg to under
25 kg; red packs for children weighing 25 kg to under
35 kg; and, green packs for children weighing more than
35 kg and adults. Weekly SMS prompts are sent to desig-
nated primary care facility health workers in each health
facility on their personal phones. Facility health workers
are then required to report back within 27 hours on the
stock count of full boxes of ACT in the store room for
each of the four types. These messages are free of charge
and if the health worker reports within 27 hours, they
receive a credit on their phone (TZS 1,000, equivalent to
USD 0.70) for personal use (pay for performance). Weekly
summary and detailed status reports of stock situations in
each facility are subsequently provided automatically to
the District Medical Officer (DMO) and the District
Pharmacist. This helps to determine and indicate which
health facilities are at risk of stocking out, or actually
stocked out of any dose level of ACT. The data are also
made available on a password-protected website which
displays current and historical stock status by health facil-
ity in a user-friendly, dashboard-driven application. Infor-
mation is provided both graphically in trend format and
on weekly-updated, interactive maps for greater interpret-
ability. The website is available to the DMOs, the Regional
Medical Officers, the NMCP, the MSD and the MoHSW-
PSS and others stakeholders including Population Services
International (PSI), Medicines for Malaria Venture
(MMV) and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC). The SMS for Life system began as a
21-week pilot in October 2009 covering 129 health
facilities in three rural districts: Kigoma Rural (Kigoma
Region), Lindi Rural (Lindi Region) and Ulanga
(Morogoro Region). It was rolled out nationally two
years later across all 132 districts, eventually covering
5,014 public health facilities by September 2011.
Data were collected from SMS for Life for 15 months, from
October 2011 to December 2012 inclusive, for this study.
The data, comprising the weekly numbers of boxes in stock
by colour-code, for each facility, were downloaded in delim-
ited ASCII format and tabulated using SAS v9.3 statistical
Table 1 Percentage of health facilities never reporting
under SMS for Life, by region, 2011 and 2012
Region 2011 (%) 2012 (%)
Singida 29.6 29.1
Dodoma 29.5 29.8
Morogoro 21.7 21.7
Manyara 14.0 16.0
Arusha 13.2 12.2
Lindi 13.1 10.8
Katavi 11.5 13.5
Mbeya 11.1 12.0
Kigoma 11.0 10.5
Ruvuma 10.1 7.6
Kilimanjaro 9.9 16.0
Dar 9.7 13.7
Tanga 8.9 9.3
Coast 8.1 7.0
Rukwa 8.0 8.0
Mwanza 6.7 8.5
Mtwara 6.5 9.5
Tabora 6.4 8.2
Simiyu 4.4 2.3
Njombe 3.8 4.3
Mara 3.1 4.3
Kagera 2.8 4.0
Geita 1.9 5.5
Iringa 0.6 1.2
Shinyanga 0.5 1.9
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were multiples of thirty of plausible numbers of boxes. It
was assumed these reports referred to numbers of blister-
packs rather than of boxes, and divided accordingly.
Weeks where stock increased (compared with the pre-
ceding report) were assumed to correspond to deliveries,
and a stock-out was identified when the facility reported
that they had no stock for one or more colours of blister
packs. The study concentrated on total ACT stock-out
when all four colours of blister-packs are simultaneously
stocked out, since health workers could otherwise cope
with a stock-out of only one or a few dose levels by dividing
or combining blister packets of other dose levels. Stock-out
data by health facility type (public and voluntary) are
shown in Figure 1. The 55,047 weeks when a stock-out
was reported fell into 11,423 sequences of continuous
reporting of stock-out in the same facility. 5,936 of these
periods ended with an ACT delivery and the remainder
terminated with a censoring event, (either a week where
the report was missing, or the end of the study). Kaplan-
Meier analysis was used to estimate the distribution of
durations of periods of stock-out allowing for these
censoring events.
The drug usage rate in facilities that were not stocked-
out was estimated as the average rate of decrease in stocks
when there was no delivery. This estimated drug usage
was added to the reported increase in stocks during weeks
when there was a delivery to give an estimate of the total
amount of drugs delivered. This study also documented
the quantities of ACT shipped and delivered to Tanzania
by Novartis Pharma AG, (which at the time of the study
was providing all public ACT in Tanzania).
Not all health facilities reported every week in both
2011 and 2012. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of health
facilities which failed to provide any report by region for
both years. For the complete year of 2012, 11% of health
facilities failed to report across the country and 8.6% of
health facilities failed to report at all during the entireFigure 1 Percentage of health facilities reporting total artemisinin
combination therapy stock-out, by health facility type (Public and
Voluntary), Tanzania, October 2011 to December 2012.study period. Wide variations in regional reporting per-
formance were identified with approximately 30% of health
facilities in Singida and Dodoma regions failing to report at
all, whilst only 0.5% of health facilities in Iringa and
Shinyanga regions provided no reports. Short-term average,
non-response rate in 2011 showed that 19.8% of weekly SMS
request prompts sent received no response, while in 2012 this
had increased to 27.7%. However the duration of non-
response in any given facility was short (average 1.8 weeks).
In instances when there was a missing report, information
was interpreted from the stock data of the previous week.
Stock-out data by region was derived from the number of
weekly SMS received across all health facilities that reported
zero stock as a proportion of the total number of SMS received
by region across the 15month study period (seeTable 2).
A simple univariate linear regression analysis was used
to study the relationship between malaria prevalence rates
and ACT stock-out rates, where regional average ACT
stock-outs across the 15 months were regressed against
regional malaria prevalence rates for 2011.
Table 2 Regional malaria prevalence and average
regional artemisinin combination therapy total stock-out
rates in health facilities in 2011-2012
Mainland region Prevalence % total stock-out
Tabora 9.2 52.4
Kigoma 26.0 51.6
Ruvuma 12.0 42.6
Geita 31.8 42.5
Shinyanga 6.8 42.1
Mtwara 17.4 41.1
Mwanza 18.6 40.3
Rukwa 4.5 37.8
Simiyu 3.4 36.8
Morogoro 13.0 35.6
Mara 25.4 31.7
Katavi 5.4 29.7
Lindi 26.3 24.7
Tanga 5.6 24.3
Njombe 2.4 22.5
Dar es Salaam 3.6 22.4
Iringa 0.4 21.9
Arusha 0.05 19.7
Kagera 8.3 19.2
Pwani 10.2 18.1
Mbeya 0.05 15.1
Kilimanjaro 0.05 14.8
Manyara 0.9 14.4
Singida 0.2 12.4
Dodoma 2.5 8.7
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During the study period, there were 3030 logins of
which 620 logins were by DMOs in districts, 32 by Min-
istry system administrators and 150 by the NMCP. The
proportion of health facilities that recorded simultan-
eous zero ACT stock of all four doses (total stock-out)
as a proportion of all health facility weeks, averaged
across the month and across all health facilities by
region, is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of health facilities with
ACT stock-out (line) while the bars indicate the ACT sup-
ply quantities (with corresponding source). For example, in
May 2012, 43% of health facilities reported zero ACT stock.
For the whole period from October 2011 to December
2012, on average 29% of SMS health facility responses
reported a total ACT stock-out. The peak total ACT stock-
out period was in the rainy season of April-May 2012, when
total ACT stock-out rates reached 40%, implying that nearly
half the country was totally stocked out of ACT in the pub-
lic sector. The estimated median duration of stock-out wassix weeks (inter-quartile range 2–14 weeks), with Dar es
Salaam experiencing the shortest ACT stock-out and
Shinyanga the highest.
Figure 3 compares average stock-out rates from the
SMS for Life reporting system and malaria prevalence in
children under the age of five, as estimated by the 2011–
2012 Tanzania National HIV/AIDs and Malaria Indicator
Survey across the 25 mainland regions of Tanzania. A sim-
ple linear regression analysis suggests that higher malaria
prevalence rates correlate positively with higher ACT
stock-out rates with every 0.8% increase in prevalence
being associated with 1% higher stock-out rates (r2 = 0.34,
p = 0.002).
The study found that over 90% of ACT doses that were
reported as delivered from Novartis in 2012 were docu-
mented by SMS for Life as passing through the supply
chain to the front-line public health facilities. However
this is a conservative estimate as it is not adjusted for non-
reporting.
Discussion
The ACT stock-outs in mainland Tanzania have not
been well documented in the literature. With the
mHealth innovation of SMS for Life producing real-time
weekly stock reporting, it has been possible for the first
time to determine the frequency, magnitude and distri-
bution of stock-outs at the point of delivery in primary
care facilities. It was found that across the 15-month study
period, average weekly health facility total ACT stock-out
rates were 29%, although short-term, non-response among
reporting units may mean actual levels are higher. More-
over, of particular concern is that ACT stock-outs aver-
aged around 40% during the rainy season of March-May
2012. These overall results are disappointing considering
the pilot programme demonstrated promising results,
where stock-outs of three out of the four doses of ACT
were greatly reduced or eliminated after the 21-week pilot
study period in three districts [22]. A similar pilot study
undertaken in Kenya in 87 health facilities across 26 weeks
from mid-2011-mid-2012 found that the 5% ACT stock-
out identified at the start of the SMS for Life programme
was completely eliminated by the end [23]. Considering
ACT is both lifesaving and available to Tanzania through
various donor assistance programmes, these long and per-
sistent stock-outs highlight an unacceptable situation.
These are evidence of severe and prolonged health system
failures which deserve prompt response at local, national
and global level.
Various factors could account for these periods of
stock-outs. The current system is designed in such a way
that Tanzania forecasts its needs for ACT in discussion
with the Global Fund and relies entirely on donor support
for its supply [24] (Figure 4). PMI has intervened numerous
times in the public sector and in 2012 provided over half
Figure 2 Percentage of health facilities with total artemisinin combination therapy stock-out, Tanzania, October 2011 to December
2012. Bars show ACT dose shipments (millions) from the supplier to the public sector (either from PMI or AMFm or both in June 2012).
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vided under the Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria
(AMFm) initiative through the Global Fund [25], aimed at
increasing universal access to malaria medicines [26].
Increased reliance on funding partners raises the risk of
creating a moral hazard. Records indicate that the
Tanzanian government has reduced its malaria budget
from USD 5.2 million in 2006–2007 to USD 2.0 million in
2008–2009 [27], a trend identified across other countries
that have reduced their domestic funding to health subse-
quent to increased donor funding [28]. Relying on donor
support puts Tanzania at risk of having to abide by external
rules and processes; for example, the delay in the Global
Fund Round 7 application in 2009 for almost two years
was a consequence of changes in grant architecture, in-
cluding consolidating various rounds that included malaria
under one grant as ‘Single Stream Funding’, and having to
restructure the grant to host the new AMFm [25,29]. Since
the government could not foresee this delay it had no plans
to mitigate the shortage. As a result, during 2009 and 2010
Tanzania had to rely on various PMI emergency ACT pro-
curements (another moral hazard), in addition to using re-
sidual funds from Round 4 and reprogramming funds
from the initial Round 7 grant for emergency ACT pro-
curement (Figure 4). Only in the second quarter of 2011
did AMFm-funded ACT for the public sector enter the
market. The entry of AMFm resulted in a dramatic price
reduction for ACT in Tanzania. Despite this price reduction
in 2012, Tanzania received from AMFm and PMI a
monthly average number of 0.9 million doses, 25% less than
the estimated requirement of 1.2 million doses per month
calculated from the yearly ACT consumption, as estimated
in the Round 9 Proposal from Tanzania [4]. The roll out ofAMFm into the public sector followed the introduction of
AMFm in the private sector. The private sector was less bur-
eaucratically constrained in accessing the AMFm mechanism
and was able to move rapidly to acquire co-paid product.
This could also explain why the public sector did not receive
sufficient quantities in the early stages of AMFm [25].
Another policy change which could impact ACT stock
was the rollout of mRDTs where other things being equal,
one could expect a reduced ACT demand following an
mRDT negative confirmation. Unfortunately SMS for Life
did not record stocks of mRDTs.
At local level, ACT together with other essential medi-
cines are delivered to health facilities through a “pull” sys-
tem, requiring health facility workers to manually fill in
orders for medicines. They then submit these quarterly to
the DMO, who forwards the requests to the MSD to pack
individual health kits. The delivery of ACT in this study
took place during a change in delivery system; previously
the MSD was responsible for delivery from the central
warehouse via its nine zonal stores to the districts, where
the DMO was then responsible for storing and delivering
them to health facilities. However in 2011, the MSD chan-
ged policy to ‘Direct Delivery’ where the MSD delivers
medicine packages directly to the health facilities [30]. If
health facility workers do not place orders, they do not
receive medicines or other commodities.
Furthermore, as there is weak reconciliation between the
health information system and the medicines ordering sys-
tem, it is impossible for the health system to assess whether
health facility workers are ordering sufficient quantities to
cater for the disease profile of the community they serve.
The Tanzania procurement and supply logistics system
requires that health facility orders be made quarterly, based
Figure 3 Malaria prevalence (top panel) and average annual total stock-out rate of artemisinin combination therapy in health facilities
(bottom panel) by region in 2011–2012 in mainland Tanzania.
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Figure 4 Chronology of important procurement and supply events for artemisinin combination therapy, Tanzania mainland, 2004 to 2012.
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formula for ordering includes a buffer stock of two months,
but such ordering systems can be confused by seasonal de-
mand and by stock-outs if they occur. Even with precise
and adequate ordering, stock-outs at front-line levels can
occur when commodities are not in full supply at regional
or national levels. This type of stock-out cannot be man-
aged at the facility level.
Prevalence of malaria and the need for treatment varies
geographically across Tanzania. Figure 3 suggests that
stock-out rates are higher and of greater duration in areas
of high prevalence compared to low prevalence, as might
be expected when there are limitations in supply. A key
implication of such consistently higher stock-out rates in
areas of higher prevalence is that populations, especially
children in most need of anti-malarial treatments, are
unable to obtain them from their local health facility.
Assuming that Tanzania orders sufficient quantities of
ACT, contributing factors to stock-outs could be poor
distribution or leakage of ACT. A study of the diversion of
anti-malarial medicines in Africa found that the largest shareof diverted anti-malarials came from Tanzania, particularly
ACT, which were found in private pharmacies in Accra and
Lagos, Nigeria [31]. Additionally, there are recent reports
that some ACT purchased from a street market in Angola in
early 2013 were part of a shipment that was originally
donated by either PMI or the Global Fund to Tanzania [32].
However, as this study reported, in 2012 90% of ACT
doses shipped were documented by SMS for Life as arriv-
ing at front-line public health facilities. This figure is sur-
prising considering that 11% of health facilities in 2012 did
not report. Several explanations are possible. Firstly, the
assumption that any increase in supply from one week to
the next corresponds to a delivery maybe incorrect; possibly
the increase was just due to undercounting in the previous
week. Secondly, additional supplies could have entered the
system from previous deliveries in 2011. Lastly, the missing
data correspond disproportionately to stock-outs, where
some facilities never had ACT and didn't see any point in
reporting. Whatever the explanation, the 90% figure is con-
servative and it is clear that there was plenty of ACT in the
system.
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stock-outs could include a complex mix of bureaucratic
challenges around vertical purchasing and procurement,
issues related to distribution strategies in relation to mal-
aria risk, other health system barriers and weaknesses in
delivery systems, and illegal diversion. All of these chal-
lenges contribute either directly or indirectly to constrain
availability of ACT at front-line health facilities.
Transparency of ACT supply is increasingly being
demanded as the situation becomes a topic of civil society
discussion [33-35]. SMS for Life reporting is password-
protected and directly accessible to only a limited group of
people in the NMCP, the MSD and PSS. However, all in-
volved in forecasting, procurement and delivery of ACT are
informed of national stock-outs through the NMCP ACT
Technical Working Group, and consequently may be
unaware of stock-outs at the dispensary level. Therefore, a
policy option available to Tanzania would be to make SMS
for Life-type data publicly available to enable all stake-
holders involved in ACT supply and provision to obtain
information on ACT stocks.
To lower the risk of future ACT stock-outs, Tanzania
mainland could consider securing subsidized ACT through
the AMFm programme and allocate domestic funds to co-
finance ACT purchases, thereby creating a national buffer
and security stock in addition to buffers built in to the
front-line health facility stocks, thereby reducing depend-
ency on donors. However a buffer or security stock is only
of value if health system supply barriers can be overcome.
SMS for Life could also be used for setting more accurate
minimum stock levels at the health facility. Most import-
antly, DMOs and District Health Management Teams
(DHMTs) must use the data to make decisions on re-
ordering, restocking and redistribution among health facil-
ities to minimize short-term stock-outs between ordering
cycles. A pattern of demand could be plotted and mod-
elled to be able to determine trends and seasonal varia-
tions in consumption rates, in order to have a more
accurate mitigation plan to avoid stock-outs.
This study has some limitations. SMS for Life data in-
clude short periods of non-reporting by individual health
facilities. The high frequency of short-term, non-response
in 2012 could have been due to the lack of immediate re-
sponse to, and follow-up of, non-reporting health facilities
by the DMO or the District Malaria Focal Person, or pos-
sibly also to a lack of health facility worker administrative
data and poor management (e.g., changes in personnel
and phone numbers and thus request messages not reach-
ing the right persons). Another possible explanation could
be that the regions receiving initial training during the
pilot did not benefit from a refresher training and subse-
quently had higher non-reporting rates; for example, in
the initial three pilot regions, Kigoma, Lindi and
Morogoro had relatively high short-term, non-responserates of between 26 and 37%. Finally, given that stock-outs
in some facilities were prolonged, the health staff may
have thought it not worthwhile to report weekly once a
stock-out started.
This study was unable to determine whether stock-out
rates were higher among non-reporting units compared to
those that did report; if that were the case, then the esti-
mate of 30% total ACT stock-out, on average, might be
10-20% too low. Further, this study was not able to exam-
ine the stock of ACT in the private sector because such
data from SMS for Life are not available (however the In-
dependent Evaluation of the AMFm Phase 1 does include
information on ACT availability in the private sector [25]).
It is likely that ACT availability would be better as the pri-
vate sector is less affected by constraints in procurement
faced by the public sector. In addition, the private sector
may have better defined incentives or disincentives struc-
tures which encourage efficiency, but this would need to
be explored further.Conclusions
This study investigated ACT availability across public
health facilities in Tanzania for 15 months from October
2011 until the end of 2012 and found that during this
period, 29% of health facility-weeks were completely
stocked out of the first-line anti-malarial (ACT). An im-
mediate consequence of this was that a significant num-
ber of the 14 million cases of malaria that Tanzania
experiences that year could not receive first-line treat-
ment at a public health facility. The principle reasons for
the failure of the health system to maintain quality of
care was due to the heavy reliance on, and difficulties in,
compliance with international funding cycles, and funda-
mental delivery system design flaws at national and sub-
national level. Both of these risks are addressable, and
should be done so urgently by Tanzania and its develop-
ment partners to avoid a catastrophic resurgence of
malaria mortality in the country. With potential ACT
resistance, it is imperative that Tanzania secures a stable
ACT supply with adequate buffer stock, and implements
the use of mRDTs to provide the population with ra-
tional use of an affordable treatment against one of the
country’s major public health concerns as part of its
strategy of ensuring universal coverage for the treatment
of malaria. Both ACT and mRDTs need to be monitored
weekly at both central and zonal warehouses and at all
public front-line health facilities, taking advantage of
new mHealth innovations, such as SMS for Life. SMS for
Life-type systems are useful to understand stock avail-
ability at point of delivery. More importantly, such real-
time information needs to be directly used for managing
the supply chain, not merely to understand by how
much it is failing.
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